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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

CASE NO. 217794

-vs~
CARLOS JOHNSON and RUTH L.
JOHNSON, his wife; FIRST
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A.;
IDEAL NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff initiated the instant action against the defendants to acquire by eminent domain, their
property for road construction purposes.

The case was

tried before a jury with the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, presiding.

Plaintiff bases its appeal on alleged errors

committed by the trial court and the failure of the verdict to conform to the evidence.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The issue of just compensation presented by
this case was tried to a jury on June 17, 1975, before
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor.

The jury returned a ver-

dict of just compensation in the sum of $95,000. The

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial which was heard on
the 17th day of July, 1975.

The trial court granted a

new trial conditioned upon the defendants1 failure to
accept a $3,000 remittitur.

The defendants accepted the

$3,000 remittitur which precluded the plaintiff from having
a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL '
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Judgment entered
in this case and requests that the matter be remanded to the
District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff filed this action to acquire property held by the defendants for highway construction purposes.

The subject property was located at the intersec-

tion of 80rh West and 2400 South Street running West out
of Salt Lake City.

The property consisted of 0.528 acres

and was improved with a commercial building, one-half of
which was used as a cafe and the other one-half was used
as a tavern.

(Tr. 136-138)

The taking consisted of the entire tract owned
by the defendants, therefore, there was no remaining land.
The sole issue was the value of the property taken, severance damage was not an issue since there was no remainder.
The property owner testified that the property
had a value to him of $125,000 and that he .would not have
•^m
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sold it for less. (Tr. 51, 52 and 56)

Plaintifffs ob-

jection to this testimony and motion to strike it were
refused. (Tr. 52, 56) Mr. Memory Cain, a real estate
appraiser from Florida testified as to the value of the
property for the defendants. (Tr. 62)

Mr. Cain testi-

fied that the property was worth $90,100, using the income approach. (Tr. 84) Using the cost approach, Mr.
Cain testified that the value was $92,000. (Tr. 88)
Mr. Zane Bergeson testified as an expert appraisal witness for the plaintiff.

Mr. Bergeson util-

ized the market, cost and income approaches and testified that the value of the property taken was $59,000
under the income approach and $54,000 using the cost
approach, (Tr. 170, 171) and Mr. Bergeson concluded
after correlating the two that the fair market value
of the property was $58,000.

(Exhibit 16-P)

Mr. Bergeson used the market approach in formulating his opinion as to the value of the land. (Tr. 144,
145)

Mr. Bergeson testified he used four sales to support

his land values and gave details on cross-examination. (Tr.
177, 180)
The jury after having heard the evidence, returned a verdict of $95,000. (Tr. 223) The amount of the
verdict was $37,000 over the estimate of plaintiff's expert witness and $3,000 over the highest estimate of the
defendants* expert witness.

Plaintiff filed a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Motion for New Trial which was heard by the District
Court and was granted unless the defendants accepted
a remittitur in the amount of $3,000.

(R. 103, Tr.

of Hearing for New Trial p. 2, 3)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS GRANTING
OF A NEW TRIAL CONDITIONED UPON PAYMENT OF $3,000 REMITTITUR.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
11

....,•

(a) Grounds. Subject
to the provisions of Rule
61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of
the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any
of the following causes; . . .
(5) Excessive or inadequate
damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision or that it is
against law. . . ."

The rule above cited has no provision granting authority
to the trial judge to change a verdict by granting either
additur or remittitur.

The plaintiff acknowledges the fact

that the practice of allowing the trial court, in some cases,
to alter jury verdicts by granting additur or remittitur has
been judicially established.

The party in a lawsuit against

whom the remittitur or additur is levied has the choice of

-4-
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either accepting the altered verdict or a new trial. The
moving party is not afforded this opportunity.
The argument may be made that the moving party,
in the instant case, the plaintiff is benefited by the
alteration of the verdict and, therefore, has no basis
for complaint.

In the instant case, the verdict was re-

duced by $3,000 saving the plaintiff that amount.

What

this argument overlooks is that under the ruling of the
trial court, the verdict is defective.

In the instant

case, the jury was either influenced by passion or prejudice or they did not understand the evidence as presented or did not follow the law as instructed.

In any

event, the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to
have its case fairly heard.
The reduction of $3,000 changes the verdict to
$92,000.

What does this sum represent?

the jury found as just compensation.

It is not what

From the record

there is no indication that that sum represents what
the trial court felt was just compensation.

The verdict

was reduced to conform to the highest testimony of the
property owner's witness, Mr. Cain.

(Tr. of Hearing on *

Motion for Netf Trial 1, 2)
The trial court relied upon the decision in
the case of Utah State Road Commission v. The Steele
Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (1975) (Tr. of Hearing on Motion
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for New Trial 2).

In the Steele Ranch case the Supreme

Court found the verdict not to be supported by the evidence and reduced it to the highest testimony of the
landowner.

It should be noted that the plaintiff in

that case did not challenge the remittitur therein
imposed.

It appears that the trial court interpreted

the Steele Ranch case to stand for the proposition that
any infirmity in the verdict at trial can be cured by
the granting of a remittitur or additur to the amount
of the highest or lowest testimony.
One may well gleen such an interpretation from
that case.

The court therein cited frailties in the case,

to wit, the insufficiency of the landowners' testimony to
support the verdict and testimony as to severance damage
on property not held in the name of the defendant being
allowed.

The court seemed to assume that a remittitur

would cure the defects

and that if the defendant ac-

cepted it the plaintiff had no right to a new trial.
The concluding remarks in that opinion seem to support
this view, the court stated:
"In view of our dis~
position of this case on
the grounds herein above
indicated, it is unnecessary to consider the claimed
impropriety in not allowing
challenge to jurors." Steele
Ranch.
This statement, along with the rest of the deDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cision seems to indicate that remittitur and additur
can be used to avoid the granting of a new trial, even
though there was a defect in the trial that would otherwise warrant a new trial.

The plaintiff in this case

has no alternative/ he must accept the remittitur if
the defendant does, even though he does not agree to
it.

This principle runs directly counter to the long

established principles of due process and the foundamental right of all parties to have their case heard
fairly by a jury.
The purpose and function of a trial was set
forth by the court in the case of Chatelain v. Thackeray,
100 P.2d 191, 98 Utah 525 at 542 (1940) as follows:
"The primary purpose
of the trial of a case is
to render justice between
the litigants. To that
end the court has the power
to exercise reasonable control over its verdicts and
when they fail to reflect
such justice in accordance
with the evidence and the
law as embodied in the instructions, to set them aside, and order a retrial
of the cause."
Plaintiff submits that "justice between the*
litigants" was not the result of the trial in the instant
case because the verdict was not supported by the evidence.
If the jury misunderstood the evidence or the law or they

-7~
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were influenced by passion or prejudice the injustice resulting therefrom is not cured by a remittitur because
the plaintiff has not had the opportunity to have the
evidence presented
jury.

• .::-y-

weighed and considered fairly by a
:.u'•'•/.-

" ./V:^-

There is support in a prior case decided by
the Utah Supreme Court for altering the amount of the
verdict as an alternative to granting a new trial if
both sides agreed to the change.

In the case of Wellman

v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350 at 351, 366 P.2d 701(1961)

the

court granted ci new trial, unless both sides agreed to
an addition of $3,000 to the general damage award and
$3,500 to the special damage award.

If there are

grounds for a new trial this alternative is the only
equitable way of altering the verdict.

By making the

adjustment contingent upon consent of both parties
neither party can complain of not having an opportunity
for a fair and impartial trial. Plaintiff submits that
in the instant case both parties should be afforded the
opportunity to accept or reject the alteration in the
verdict and if either party fails to accept it, the
new trial must be granted.
The cases that plaintiff discovered relating
to additur and remittitur all presented the situation
where the party questioning the ruling of the court was

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the party having the option either to accept or reject
the alteration in the verdict.

Clearly in the situation

of the defendants in the instant action, if he is dissatisfied with the remittitur, he may elect a new trial
or question the court's ruling granting a new trial as
being an abuse of discretion by filing an appeal.
The plaintiff is faced with the dilemma of a-'
greeing with the court that a nev/ trial should be granted,
but that the alternative given to the defendant to accept
remittitur is improper.
Plaintiff submits that the evidence failed to
support the verdict and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that the jury was either influenced by passion
or prejudice or did not understand or wish to follow the
evidence presented or the law as instructed.

Plaintiff

submits that the following brief review of portions of
the evidence will clearly illustrate this position.
As pointed out earlier, the landowners1 testimony was based upon what the property was worth to him
(Tr. 56), which is clearly an improper basis for establishing value and also he admitted he had no background .'.*
upon which to base his opinion (Tr. 56) and further,
when asked what he based his $125,000 evaluation upon,
the property owner responded:
A. "Well, it is my life's
work and it provided me a
good living." (Tr. 51)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q. "Would you have sold
it for anything less than
that?" (Tr. 52)
The plaintiff's objection was overruled at this
point, but the impropriety of the basis for the owners1
testimony is clear as set out in Point II of this brief,
and such testimony should have been kept from the jury*
Mr. Cain, the defendants1 appraiser, in his testi
mony repeatedly demonstrated lack of knowledge as to critical facts.

In establishing a value on the land taken he

did not have any comparable sales, but concluded, without
support, that the land was worth $11,500 (for approximately one-half acre or $23,000 per acre)(Tr. 83). His
land evaluation was based solely upon his "experience."
(Tr. 93)

He admitted that he had previously made an ap-

praisal involving a similar type property east of the
subject tract for $12,500 per acre.

In his analysis of

value using the income approach, Mr. Cain used what he
termed comparable rental properties. (Tr. 95)

When asked

for information about those comparables he knew very little
He did not know the name of the tavern he used as a comparable located in Granger, Utah. (Tr. 95)

He did not

know whether or not there was a large advertising sign
on this comparable property.

(Tr. 96)

He used the ren-

tal income from this property, but did not know when the
lease was dated. (Tr. 96)

He did not know how large the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

*

building in Granger was. (Tr. 97)

He did not. recall

whether or not there was a large awning over the entrance
of this comparable property. (Tr. 97)

He did not recall

whether or not this comparable had a separate entrance
to the basement.

The comparable had a basement and

the subject property did not, but no adjustment was made
for that. Mr. Cain did not know the seating capacity of
the Granger property.

(Tr. 98)

He repeatedly indicated

that his answers were just guesses or "off-the-cuff"
guesses or he did not recall.

(Tr. 96-100)

Mr. Cain

made no attempt to determine the square foot value of
the comparables.

(Tr. 99)

He testified that size did

not matter and when asked:
»fc*

-

Q. "Mr. Cain, if you had
a club that had a seating
capacity of double or three
times the seating capacity
of another establishment,
wouldn't that be a relevant
factor in comparing the two?
A. Not if you didn't fill
it up. If one was half empty
and one was full. I am looking at the income they produce,
not the seating capacity or the
square foot size of it or what
the inside looks like versus
what another one looks like."
(Tr. 103)

What is even more revealing is he offered no
testimony as to whether his comparables were only "half
full" and the subject "full."

In fact when asked:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q. "Now, you indicated on
your redirect examination
that size doesn't matter if
you have an empty place.
It doesn't make any difference,
a small full place is worth
more than an empty large place."
.;

A. "That's correct."
Q. " . . . Do you know how
much income from customers
and business Fogarty's had?"
A. "No, sir.
the books."

I did not go into

Q. "Do you know the income of
the Putter Club?"
A. "No, sir. I didn't go into
the books." (Tr. 110)
Plaintiff submits that Mr. Cain had no idea as
to which places were "full" or "half full" and his analysis
was, therefore, lacking critical data.
The other comparables used by Mr. Cain were fraught
with similar frailties.

(Tr. 100-106)

With regard to the

Ludlow Cafe, used by Mr. Cain as a comparable, he did not
know the size of the building, the seating capacity, the
age of the building or even what the building looked like.
(Tr. 105)
Mr. Cain, in his testimony using the cost approach
to value used a cost table called "Marshall Swift Evaluation
Tables."

(Tr. 110)

The table he used was in the category

of "Class C Average Restaurant."

(Tr. 110)

The cost under

this table included air conditioning, (Tr. Ill, 112) which

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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according to Mr. Cain, would allow for adequate air conditioning to the building.

(Tr. 112) Mr. Cain added

$675 for air conditioning to the cost table in Marshall
Swift, even though the table already provided for such
an item.

(Tr. Ill, 112)
A critical factor in the instant case was the

economic life of the building located on the subject property.

Mr. Cain testified that the economic life was 60

years.

(Tr. Ill)

There seemed to be no basis for his deter-

mination of a 60 year economic life.

The Marshall Swift

Table used by Mr. Cain in the catagory of Class C average
reflected a life on such a structure of 35 years.
150)

(Tr.

Mr. Cain's testimony contained no indication as to

why he followed the Marshall Swift Tables in determining
estimated costs of replacement, but ignored the estimated
life expectancy of such structure.
Plaintiff's purpose in pointing out the frailties in the defendants' expert testimony is to demonstrate
that the verdict rendered by the jury was not supported by
the evidence and that it must have either been influenced
by passion or prejudice based on the landowner's testimony
relating to his lifes work and what it was worth to him
or the jury misunderstood the evidence.

In

any

event,

plaintiff contends it was denied the right of having the
evidence fairly weighed by an impartial jury. .

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The circumstances in the instant case should
be treated as this court treated a similar situation in
the case of State Road Commission v. Sillimanf 22 Utah
2d 33, 448 P.2d 347 (1968).. The Court in that case stated:
"The instant case is a good
illustration of the principle that the verdict cannot
stand when it clearly shows
that it was given either under
the influence of passion or
prejudice or under a lack of
understanding of the law.

'.

H

*

« »

State Road Commission v. Silliman, Supra at 37
The court in the Silliman case did not grant a
remittitur but set the verdict aside and remanded the case
for a new trial.
at 37.

State Road Commission v. Silliman/ Supra

In the Silliman case the trial judge remitted an

amount to bring the severance damage award within the range
of the testimony.

State Road Commission v. Silliman, Supra

at 36. Notwithstanding the reduction by the trial court, the
Supreme Court granted a new trial because the verdict was
not supported by the evidence.

Plaintiff submits that the

result in the instant case should be the same as that in
the

Silliman case, since the verdict is not supported by *

the evidence.
In another recent case decided by this court, an
excessive jury verdict was reversed instead of merely granting a remittitur.

In State Road Commission v. Roy Brown,
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531 P.2d 1294 (1975), the jury awarded severance damages
of $53,378 when the defendants' testifimony was only
$45,111.51.

The court could have reduced the verdict

to conform to the evidence, but it did not.

This case

demonstrates that alteration of a verdict to conform
to the evidence is not always a proper means of dealing
with error committed at the trial court level. Plaintiff submits that remittitur in the instant case will
not correct the error committed at the trial court
level, nor will it represent an award of "just compensation."
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PROPERTY
OWNER TO TESTIFY TO A VALUE FOUNDED ON IMPROPER BASIS.
The usual basis for determining "just compensation" in a condemnation case is the market value of the
property taken. Market value has been defined as what a
willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept for the property.

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10

Utah 2d 306 at 309, 352 P.2d 693 (1960).

A more detailed

definition is recited in Nichols on Eminent Domain as follows:
"By 'fair market value'
is meant the amount of money
which a purchaser willing
but not obliged to buy the
property would pay to an
owner willing but not ob- •
ligated to sell it, taking
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into consideration all
uses for which the land
was suited and might reason- ..
ably be applied."
Vol. 4 Nichols on Eminent
Domain § 12.2[1] p. 12-62
to 12-71

,

The above cited authorities make it clear that
the standard in determining market value is what a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller accept.

It is

obvious, based upon this standard, that testimony relating only to what a willing buyer would pay for property
unsupported with what a willing seller would accept would
be improper.

Likewise, it would be improper to allow in-

to evidence what a seller would sell property for without
also establishing that a willing buyer would pay such a
price.

The short of it is that clearly the test is not

what a seller says the property is worth to him.

The

U. S. Supreme Court addressing itself to this issue in a
case involving Utah property stated:
"The Constitution and
statutes do not define the
meaning of just compensation.
But it has come to be recognized that just compensation
is the value of the interest
taken. This is not the value
to the owner for his particular purposes or to the condemnor for some special use
but a so-called !market value.1"
United States v. Petty Motor
C£. , 327 U.S. 372 (1946)
• Emphasis added.
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The Supreme Court of Washington dealt with
the issue squarely in a case where a property owner had
testified to value based upon improper criteria.

The

court in the case of State v. Larson, 338 P.2d 135 at 136
(Wash. 1959) stated:
"An owner of property
may testify as to its value
(without qualifying as an
expert), upon the assumption
that he is particularly familiar with it and, because of
his ownership, knows of the
uses for which it is particularly adaptable, (citations
omitted). However, when, as
here, the owner has not used
his intimate experience with
and knowledge of the land's
uses as a basis for determining its fair market value,
but has obviously determined
it upon the application of
an improper formula, his opinion fails to meet the test
and, therefore, has no probative value."
The court sustained a motion to strike the
owner's testimony in the Larson case. The instant case
presents a situation precisely the same as that in the
Larson case.

The property owner in the instant case

responded to direct examination questions as follows;
when asked the value of the property, his answer was:
A. "A hundred twenty to a
$125,000."
Q. "What do you base that
on?"

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. "Well, it is my life's
work and it provided me a
good living."
Q. "Would you have sold it
for anything less than that?"
A. "No."

(Tr. 51,. 52)

Later on cross-examination the property owner
stated that he was not an appraiser and when asked if he
knew anything about the valuation of property, he replied:
A. "I know what it (his
property) is worth to
me." (Tr. 56)
Then when asked:
Q. "And is that what your
testimony is based on, Mr.
Johnson, is this what the
subject property is worth
to you?"
A. "Yes."

(Tr. 56)

The plaintiff made a motion to strike the owner's
testimony because it was based upon improper foundation.
This motion was denied.

(Tr. 56)

In Arkansas the court reached the same conclusion
as the court in the Larson case.

In Arkansas State Highway

Commission v. Parr, 246 Ark. 204, 437 S.W.2d 463 (1969),
the court ruled that a landowner's testimony was not substantial evidence, since the basis upon which she made her
evaluation was inadequate.

The court in the Parr case

found the verdict over the testimony of the owner's expert
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witness but under the owner's was excessive and the case
was remanded.
In Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Perryman, 247 Ark. 120, 444 S.W.2d 564 (1969), the owner gave
testimony of what the condemned property was worth to
him.

The court stated:
"His testimony cannot be considered substantial because compensation cannot be based
on value to the owner."
Arkansas State Highway
Commission v. Perryman,
Supra at 565.
In another Arkansas case the reviewing court

found that the trial court had erred in failing to
strike the testimony of a landowner where it was without sufficient basis and it was based on what the land .
was worth to him.

Arkansas State Highway Commission v.

Bowman, 253 Ark. 890, 490 S.W.2d 112 (1973).
Plaintiff submits that the above cited cases
make it clear that the trial court committed error in
refusing to strike the incompetent testimony of the
owner.

This failure resulted in opening the door for

the jury to award damages based on clearly erroneous
formulae, to wit: his life's income, what the property
was worth to him and that he would not sell it for less.
Mention should be made of the case where the
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Utah Supreme Court sustained a verdict in excess of the
property owner's expert witnesses and awarded exactly
the amount of his testimony.

State Road Commission v.

Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507 (1970).

The dif-

ferences between the Dillree case and the instant case
are obvious and substantial.

The trial court in the

instant case acknowledged the distinction with the following comment:
" . . . in the Dillree
case, the court recites
that the owner had familiarity with the costs of
-construction and land values
in the area. There was no
such evidence in the case
at bar, . . . "
(Tr. of Hearing on Motion
For New Trial p. 2)
The distinction made by the trial court is
supported by the record heretofore cited and the plaintiff submits that, therefore, the Dillree case should
not be controlling.
CONCLUSION

'

Plaintiff submits that the trial court in the
instant case erred in refusing to strike the property
owner's testimony was based on improper formulae in .
determining market value.

The testimony was prejudicia

and allowed the jury to speculate regarding damages for
loss of the defendants1 "life's work" and what property
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was "worth to him."
Plaintiff submits that merely remitting the
amount of the verdict over the defendants' expert testimony does not render the verdict fair and
Plaintiff.

ju st

to the

The revised verdict does not represent a

fair verdict of a jury based on competent evidence,
since incompetent evidence was allowed for its oonsideration.
Plaintiff submits the only remedy for the defective proceedings is to reverse the decision and remand the matter for a new trial and plaintiff respectfully requests this court to do so.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DONALD S. COLEMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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